problematic and will be considered at length later. First, though, it is necessary to discuss the jokes themselves, why we should see them as important, the circumstances of their telling, and the joke-tellers' relationship to the political hierarchy.
T H E I M P O R T A N C E O F T H E J O K E S
Jokes under communism had a far greater personal, political, intellectual, and historical importance than is the case with political jokes told in traditional or democratic societies, or indeed under autocratic regimes that suppress opposition but do not seek to control and transform independent social institutions or to insist on enthusiasm. The personal importance of the jokes can be inferred from the risks that so many individuals took in telling and circulating them when they knew that being reported to the authorities could result in possible imprisonment or deportation and even death. 1 Indeed there are jokes that refer directly to the spying on, arrest, trial, and punishment of joke-tellers. 2 That people took such risks is both an indication of the importance the jokes had for them and of the strong and interlocking networks of interpersonal trust and solidarity that they had created, which provided them with some degree of independence from an overwhelmingly powerful state. 3 In Estonia, the philologist Jü ri Viikberg wrote down and saved 4,000 ''bilious and offensive anti-Soviet jokes'' between 1960 and 1986, which were then secretly stored for the Estonian folklore archives, waiting for the coming of a free and independent Estonia. 4 Jokes mattered.
For the authorities and particularly for the secret police, the Cheka, the OGPU, the NKVD, and the KGB, henceforth referred to collectively as the KGB, the jokes were also important, both as a form of subversion and opposition reported by informers and as a source of information about public opinion. The secret police regularly collected and sometimes repressed political jokes. Indeed the KGB files may well turn out to be the best source of ethnographic data on anti-Soviet humorous folklore in general, including graffiti, parody, and chastushki (satirical songs or limericks), since all other records of these were, of necessity, censored and bowdlerized. 5 If the jokes are seen as an indication of popular alienation, then the secret police were right to take them seriously as a political phenomenon, particularly in a society where no other measures of public opinion were possible.
The jokes were so much a part of everyday understanding that people in the Soviet Union and eastern Europe would routinely use them to make a point. This was not just to render an account more entertaining, but because, as one Uzbek put it, an anecdote could contain ''the whole tragedy and drama of an event''. 6 Jokes were used because they had force as well as because they gave pleasure. Jokes were remembered and transmitted better than other aspects of informal culture. 7 Jokes were used under communism as a means of conveying insight, far more than they are or ever have been in other kinds of society.
J O K E S O F T H E T I M E O F T E R R O R A N D J O K E S O F T H E T I M E O F R O U T I N E O P P R E S S I O N
The political jokes of the Soviet Union and its satellites can for convenience be roughly divided into two eras, the time of terror, roughly 1928-1956, and the time of routine oppression, 1956-1985. Many political jokes were, of course, invented and told both before and after these two periods. However, there is a scarcity of contemporary accounts for the earlier period and it is difficult to know whether, say, jokes about Lenin were invented during his time or were a product of the later cult of Lenin culminating in the hundredth anniversary of his birth in 1970. Likewise, there are many jokes from the Gorbachev era, immediately prior to the final demise of communism, first in eastern Europe and then in the Soviet Union. However, these are fewer in number, particularly after it had become possible to discuss political issues freely in public and the jokes were co-opted by the elite, being used in speeches by Gorbachev and even by leading figures in the KGB. 8 Both the content of the jokes of the time of terror and the circumstances of their telling differed from those of the later period. It is hardly surprising, since the time of terror, which I have dated from Stalin's consolidation of power by 1928 to Khruschev's denunciation of terror in his speech to the XXth Congress of the CPSU in 1956, saw the killing of many millions of innocent people and the arbitrary imprisonment and exile of tens of millions of others. 9 The era from Khrushchev to Chernenko was undoubtedly repressive and oppressive but it was not characterized by the same level of ruthless and sometimes random callousness.
The jokes of the time of terror refer directly 10 to the crushing of the peasants with forced collectivization, the deportation of the kulaks, and the deliberately created famines. 11 They refer to the purges of engineers, intellectuals, and Party members in the 1930s, 12 to the anti-Semitic persecutions of the Jews, particularly in 1946-1953, the black years of Soviet Jewry, 13 and to the torture, executions, and labour camps. We may also include jokes about the harsh labour laws of the period 1940-1956, when workers were forbidden to change their jobs and were subject to criminal penalties (including the labour camp) for such irregularities as being more than twenty minutes late for work. 14 There was clearly much for members of all classes and nations to protest about and we can readily document from independent sources the horrors to which the jokes refer. Yet there were far fewer jokes about Stalin, ''Koba the Dread'', the cunning, the cruel, the ruthless, the monster, than about Khruschev, Brezhnev, Andropov, and Chernenko (whom the jokes depicted as buffoons), fewer jokes about Stalin's violent times than about their routine oppression. 15 The smaller number of political jokes from the time of terror relative to its successor, the Khruschev to Chernenko era, creates problems for the simple version of the thesis that the jokes were a form of protest. This view has been most strongly advocated by the leading anthropologist of jokes, Alan Dundes, who has written that ''the more repressive the regime, the more numerous the political jokes'', 16 and in Banc and Dundes that ''the more repressive the ideology and system the more ingenious and clever the political wit''. 17 However, far more political jokes seem to have been generated in the less oppressive years, 1956-1985, building up steadily to a peak in the later years of the Brezhnev era at the beginning of the 1980s. 18 Dundes's proposition is clearly false, or at the very least there is another more powerful factor at work, namely that it had become safer to tell political jokes, since the chances of being apprehended were lower and the penalties less drastic. Even during the thaw of the late 1950s there was a marked growth in the relaxed telling of political jokes. 19 Good joke-tellers were popular and esteemed. By the late 1960s it was common at an intermission in any gathering to reel out a string of anekdoty, the political jokes, and this was even more open and common by the late 1970s. 20 In Bulgaria in the early 1980s my English-speaking colleagues would openly exchange jokes with me in a crowded restaurant, the only precaution being observed that Brezhnev was referred to as ''Mister B'', lest the laughter following his name should arouse suspicion. We were a long way from the time when one could be arrested even for smiling at a political joke told by strangers at an adjoining table. 21 Jokes no longer had to be told in the seclusion of the bathroom, as had been the case when exchanged by intellectuals during the time of terror. 22 Yet it is also clear that the jokes travelled easily between the less repressive communist countries such as Poland and Hungary and a very repressive one such as Ceausescu's Romania, the source of the jokes studied by Dundes. 23
J O K E S A S A P R O D U C T O F T H E B R E A D T H O F O P P R E S S I O N .
The link between repression and the flourishing of jokes is to be sought not in the intensity of the repression but in its extensiveness. In the last years of Franco's rule in Spain there were many political jokes that mocked the Caudillo himself, 24 but neither in numbers nor in intricacy could they match those being told in the Soviet Republics and eastern Europe. There was less to joke about. The Franco regime did not seek to control most non-political activities, nor to establish a monopoly over economic transactions. Franquismo was not an ideology but the rule of a particular person and the Falanga was not a ruling party in the communist sense. 25 In consequence Spain shared with the communist countries some of the jokes 19 of the era of routine oppression, those about dim, limited, and eventually senile rulers, 26 but there were very few political jokes of other more sophisticated kinds about economic or ideological or scientific matters.
Communism generated more and more sophisticated jokes because it sought to control so much, both materially and ideologically, giving rise to the possibility of political jokes about the absurdities of official science and history and of its detailed and endlessly reinterpreted ideology. Likewise communism demanded active unfreedom; where merely authoritarian regimes are content with acquiescence, communism demanded enthusiasm and compulsory participation and even belief in its newly minted rules and rituals, celebrations and processions, myths and exemplary stories, all of which became the subject of jokes. 27
J O K E S : F R O M S H O R T A G E S T O S H O D D Y
The biggest topic of the jokes under communism was the ubiquitous shortages, the queuing in line for food and basic necessities, and the poor quality of housing and consumer goods; 28 these were not economic jokes but political ones, since the state controlled the economy and claimed responsibility for the welfare of its citizens and repeatedly told them how well off they were. These jokes are continuous from the 1920s to the 1980s but there are once again two phases and two patterns of joking.
In the time of terror the standard of living for all except a highly privileged elite was extremely low. The independent economic life of the peasantry had been destroyed and in the towns wages forced down to the point where most of a family's income went on food and even then the people were hungry and sometimes close to starvation. 29 Housing and working conditions were bad and collectivized agriculture could not provide enough food. The jokes reveal all these disasters of the everyday and are in contrast with the slogans that life was better and life was joyful in the egalitarian workers' state. The special and privileged position of a small Party elite who had access to unlimited food through multiple ration books, to special TORGSIN shops that sold luxuries, and to luxurious housing was also a subject of joking. Slogans and promises related to reality in a way that was absurd, a breeding ground for jokes as well as resentment.
Yet once again, more scarcity jokes seem to have been told under Khruschev and Brezhnev at a time when standards of living were rising and money wages rising even faster and the government was prepared to spend foreign currency on imported grain rather than allow starvation. 30 The jokes about the poor quality of goods and services and the necessity to import grain at least indicate that food and goods and services, albeit shoddy and inefficient, were available. But the modest improvements in people's standard of living may well have led to rising expectations and in turn to a new kind of popular discontent when these were not met. In the face of failure, the excuses made by and for a regime that owns all the means of production and boasts of its economic performance will not be believed by its own citizens, who neither chose it nor are able to make their own autonomous economic decisions.
H U M O U R A N D T H E P O L I T I C S O F B L A M E
The rulers of the Soviet Union consistently tried to pin the blame for economic failure, particularly in the production of consumer goods, on lower-level functionaries. These included petty bureaucrats, collective farmers, repair men, or even the workers in particular factories. Disgruntled individuals were encouraged to write and complain about low-level functionaries both to more powerful officials at the centre and to the press, which often published their letters. 31 What is more significant, though, is what was not printed, such as complaints about hunger, cold, shortages, official regulations. 32 The tactic was to divert blame. All faults were local and the blame lay with erring individuals.
Official humour was an extension of this pattern, in which approved journals with sharp and prickly names such as Crocodile, Nettles, Porcupine, Hornet, Stag Beetle, Thistle, would publish satires and cartoons about those in the front line who had to deal directly with workers, clients, and customers. No-one powerful was ever mocked in this way, nor was the political and economic system, and editors could be sacked for getting too close to the boundary of the permissible. 33 The humour of the people was the opposite of this in two senses. First, there were numerous jokes about the ubiquitous scarcities, the blame for which the jokes clearly pinned on the system, the politicians, the Party, and the planners. The jokes mirror the resentful complaints to be found in the KBG files for the earlier period or the views expressed in the brief interval in 1968 when public opinion polls were allowed in Czechoslovakia; 34 the people blamed their rulers, often harshly and abusively. The two kinds of humour are also opposites in another sense. The official humour was planned with a particular purpose in mind. It was intentional and tendentious, its authors more concerned to try to arouse scorn and indignation through ridicule than to be funny. Jokes are not like that. They have no authors and it is impossible to infer tone, purposes, and feelings from the text; these are a product of the telling and this can be highly varied. 35 
J O K E S A N D P R O T E S T
The points made above about the anonymity and ambiguousness of jokes, qualities of all jokes, not just political ones, creates serious problems for those who see a clear straightforward link between jokes and protest. We can see this, in another parallel case, that of the Nazi occupation of many of Europe's countries during World War II, which produced numbers of so-called ''resistance jokes''. 36 After the war many would recall these jokes with pleasure and cite them as proof that they too had been resisters, when in truth they, like most of their fellow citizens, had lived in the grey area of more or less collaboration.
The view of jokes as resistance was strongly propounded by Obdrlik 37 in relation to the resistance movement in the Czech lands. He claimed that the numerous jokes circulating there about the German occupation were proof of the existence of a strong and vigorous resistance movement, whose morale was sustained by the jokes, whilst that of the enemy was undermined. However, Bryant 38 was able to show later that the Czech resistance movement had been negligible in size, organization, and impact and had achieved nothing; political jokes in circulation were regularly reported back to the Czech government in exile in London as an index of resistance but there was little else to report.
Many other humour scholars have asserted, usually without evidence, that humour is an effective form of resistance, a boost for the oppressed, and an underminer of their oppressors. 39 Others have denied the effectiveness of jokes and even claimed that jokes are a safety valve that help oppressive regimes to survive and that it is counter-productive to try to suppress them. 40 It is extremely unlikely that, taken in aggregate, jokes have any significant effect one way or the other, particularly when compared with other stronger social forces. No such effects have ever been demonstrated at a macro-level. Jokes are a thermometer not a thermostat; they can be used as an indication of what is happening in a society but they do not feed back into the social processes that generated them to any significant extent.
In all face-to-face groups humour is used, often effectively, in conjunction with other techniques and mechanisms, both to maintain the identity of a group and the furtherance of its goals. This is true not just of groups involved in protest but of groups involved in oppression, of groups in the workplace, and of groups involved in leisure activities. It would be wrong to infer automatically from this that the existence of a large anonymous joke-cycle critical of a regime is an index of protest.
J O K E S A N D C A R N I V A L
There is a parallel between the jokes told under communism and the carnival behaviour of medieval times when the rites and rituals of the Church were burlesqued, the social distance between the high and the lowly diminished, the mighty mocked and the world turned upside down. 41 In many ways this is what jokes under communism did, for slogans, ideological arguments, and political catechisms were parodied and inverted, solemn political rituals and uplifting tales about heroes such as Chapaev, or cult figures, notably Lenin, were reduced to foolishness, or even nastiness, and current leaders shown as complete fools. 42 Indeed it has been suggested that when Bakhtin wrote about the medieval carnival, in many ways he had in mind the popular humorous culture of the Soviet Union, a subject about which it was forbidden to write. 43 Carnivals may well be benign events that, though the antithesis of the social order, reinforce it. Hans Speir uses this analogy when he argues that political jokes are a safety valve. 44 Yet can it be shown that this is true of carnivals in general? The regime certainly did not think so, for it fostered blasphemous carnivals got up by communist aktivists as a political weapon to undermine the Russian Orthodox church. 45 Also the carnivals of the type of which Bakhtin speaks were regular, even scheduled, licensed events. Soviet joke-telling in Bakhtin's time was private, forbidden, and often furtive, a subject for surveillance, licence not licensed. The analogy is dubious.
The same point may be made in relation to the view that the jokes were like those told about priests by faithful rural church-goers in Tsarist Russia or in Catholic Bavaria, or about trickster but loyal 41 servants making fools of their masters. 46 No doubt such jokes can occur in a local social order legitimized by custom and tradition and circulate among priests and masters themselves, who do not find them threatening. But how would we regard such jokes if told in a society riven by intense class antagonisms or anti-clericalism, where priests and masters are loathed?
J O K E S A S A S U B S T I T U T E F O R R E S I S T A N C E A N D T H E C O L L A P S E O F T H E O L D R E G I M E
Some have argued that jokes are even a substitute for protest and resistance to harsh regimes, not just a safety valve or a pain-killer but an opiate, and indeed follow this up with the supporting claim that when the true mutiny and resistance starts the jokes cease. 47 The moral, though, is not that one is a substitute for the other but that external circumstances dictate which is possible. What is far more significant is the speed with which the jokers switch to overt opposition when the power of the oppressor is removed or relaxed, an indication that the jokes were part of a protest but one circumscribed by circumstance. Should there be a shift in the balance of power in favour of the oppressed, far from abandoning their political jokes, they may well make them part of their new and more overt and vigorous forms of resistance. This is what happened with the growth of a more confident and effective Norwegian resistance movement in the latter years of World War II and at the time of open public protests in Czechoslovakia in 1968 or in Poland. 48 The jokes now became attached to and incorporated in a serious rhetoric of resistance. Jokes do not make the rhetoric more persuasive or meaningful but they enliven it. They are not a sword but they are attractive decoration on the scabbard. The jokes of resentful resignation quickly become the jokes that accompany active resistance.
Some humour scholars have regarded those who told jokes under communism as exhibiting a ''humour that has ceased to struggle'', 49 the humour of cynical and alienated people no longer able to protest or resist, unable even to envisage an alternative to the immutable, omnipresent, overwhelmingly powerful political system that dominated every aspect of their lives. In the time of terror they had been demoralized and by the time of routine oppression they had come to take the system for granted, as inevitable and as ever-lasting. 50 It is difficult to reconcile this view with the sheer revolutionary speed with which communist rule in eastern Europe collapsed in 1989 and in the Soviet Union itself in 1991. It proved to have been not a stable system but a rigid one in unstable equilibrium that, once disturbed, was destroyed; the jokes were a symptom of this, a predictor of the collapse, a protest against its lack of legitimacy.
Once Gorbachev, who had no idea he was opening the way to collapse, had made it clear to the east European leadership in 1985 and in 1986 that he would no longer use the Soviet army to prop up the east European regimes, they were finished, at least once their peoples had worked out that this was the case. Jaruselski dared not reintroduce martial law in Poland in 1989 for fear of a bloodbath, so he permitted a rigged election. Solidarity won an overwhelming victory. Next the Berlin Wall came down and the communist regime in East Germany collapsed and within a matter of weeks all the rest had gone. Only external military force had ever kept them in power. Within two years the Ukraine, the Baltic states, and all the other non-Russian republics had seceded from the Soviet Union and Russia itself had ceased to be communist. The alternative future envisaged in the jokes had happened.
Well before the ''Autumn of the Nations'' in 1989 there had been times of public and sometimes violent protest, notably in East Germany in 1953, Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, in Poland repeatedly, which were only crushed by Soviet tanks or the threat of tanks. Again what was striking was the speed of the collapse; in the Hungarian Revolution the old order ceased in a matter of days. 51 Between revolts the oppressed told political jokes about communism. The jokes were not a substitute for protest but an interim protest until the next opportunity for something more vigorous. Here at least, jokes are a continuation of protest by other means.
We can even see this pattern in the Soviet Union in the time of terror in 1939-1941. There existed at this time an extensive humorous folklore that spoke of the overthrowing of Soviet power by war. 52 In 1941 the peoples of the Ukraine, Byelorussia, the Baltic states, and the first occupied Russian territories at first welcomed the German invader and even fired on the retreating Soviet army. In the Baltic states uprisings and shooting began well before the Germans arrived. After the war local partisan warfare against the Soviet authorities continued until the early 1950s. Entire Soviet nationalities were deported lest they do the same. 53 A million Soviet citizens changed sides and fought for the Germans. 54 Jokes and apparent apathy can quickly turn to open conflict. Only a realization that the Nazis had come to exploit and murder the inhabitants of the conquered territories, whom they treated as sub-human Slavs, and a very rapid switch by Stalin away from the previous ideology to Russian patriotism and tradition enabled the regime to survive and eventually win.
P O L I T I C A L J O K E S A N D P O L I T I C A L P R E D I C T I O N S
It is not just a case of being wise after the event. During the course of 1981-1982 Alexander Shtromas, then lecturing in Peace Studies in England, convinced me that the jokes were not only a protest of the weak but a harbinger of collapse. Professor Shtromas followed his 1981 book, Political Change and Social Development: The Case of the Soviet Union, about how the collapse would come about 55 with a plan for a large conference called ''The Fall of the Soviet Empire'', which was held in Geneva in 1985. He invited me to give a paper there ''Humour for the Future and the Future for Humor'', 56 which proved to be somewhat prescient. Most Sovietologists preferred to extol the system's stability, legitimacy, and durability. Yet Shtromas, who was condemned and criticized at the time, was within six years proved right, and the jokes were part of his case, not as a cause of the collapse, but as a form of protest that indicated a danger that the Sovietologists could not see.
Now that the Soviet government files, including some of the KGB files, have been examined by many scholars, we can see why the jokes were a good index of what was happening. Between times of overt protest the jokes flourished and lived alongside other totally serious expressions of low-level dissent and of passive resistance, the weapons of the weak. 57 The jokes were the transportable, context-free, pleasurable aspect of this defiance that we know about; the rest was only observed and observable on a large scale by the secret police. The jokes were the tip of an iceberg of discontent. It is this that enables us to calibrate the jokes as an aggregate phenomenon and to confirm our earlier suspicions. We cannot do this from the texts of the jokes alone, for, after all, even the members of the KGB enjoyed them, nor from the post-Soviet reminiscences of those who joked, whose memories may be selective or atypical or affected by later events. 58 Rather it is the evidence of how the joke-tellers behaved in others ways at the time that enables us to define the jokes as protest and to see why they were a good predictor of the, to most observers quite unexpected, end of communism in Europe. 58 . Deriabin and Gibney, The Secret World, pp. 38, 61, 141, 175, 220, 227; Thurston, Social Dimensions of Stalinist Rule, p. 594.
